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Significant technology advances will enable future aerospace systems to safely and 
reliably make decisions autonomously, or without human interaction. The decision-making 
may result in actions that enable an aircraft or spacecraft in an off-nominal state or with 
slightly degraded components to achieve mission performance and safety goals while 
reducing or avoiding damage to the aircraft or spacecraft. Some key technology enablers for 
autonomous decision-making include: a continuous state awareness through the maturation 
of the prognostics health management field, novel sensor development, and the considerable 
gains made in computation power and data processing bandwidth versus system size. 
Sophisticated algorithms and physics based models coupled with these technological 
advances allow reliable assessment of a system, subsystem, or components. Decisions that 
balance mission objectives and constraints with remaining useful life predictions can be 
made autonomously to maintain safety requirements, optimal performance, and ensure 
mission objectives. This autonomous approach to decision-making will come with new risks 
and benefits, some of which will be examined in this paper. To start, an account of previous 
work to categorize or quantify autonomy in aerospace systems will be presented.  In 
addition, a survey of perceived risks in autonomous decision-making in the context of piloted 
aircraft and remotely piloted or completely autonomous unmanned autonomous systems 
(UAS) will be presented based on interviews that were conducted with individuals from 
industry, academia, and government. 
I. Introduction 
he Aviation Safety Program (AvSafe) under the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) at NASA 
is investigating the safety aspects that are necessary to realize the full potential of the Next Generation Aircraft 
Transportation System (NextGen). State-of-the-art networking and data acquisition and data fusion technology will 
continually update NextGen’s state data and share relevant information with pilots and air traffic controllers. 
Aircraft will be able to rapidly and safely adjust to changing factors such as weather, traffic congestion, flight 
trajectories, aircraft spacing, and any terrestrial or airborne security concerns. Working with partners, AvSafe 
provides fundamental research on existing safety challenges and on new and emerging challenges created by the 
transition to NextGen, including significant increases in air traffic, introduction of new vehicle concepts, continued 
operation of legacy vehicles, increased reliance on automation, and increased operating complexity. Under the 
umbrella of NASA's Aviation Safety Program, the System-wide Safety Assurance Technologies (SSAT) Project 
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provides knowledge, concepts and methods to proactively manage increasing complexity in the design and operation 
of vehicles and air transportation systems, including automation design tools and prognostic algorithm design.
1
  
Significant advances in several technology areas will enable future aeronautic systems to safely and reliably 
make decisions autonomously, or without interacting with humans or other technological systems. By using system 
health monitoring information to determine remaining useful life (RUL) of components of an aircraft, autonomous 
decision-making algorithms may be able to mitigate the detrimental effect of degrade health and increase the safety 
of aircraft systems operation. Such autonomous decision-making could enable aircraft to achieve mission 
performance and safety goals despite the presence of an off-nominal state, or with slightly degraded components. 
Some key technology enablers for this type of autonomous decision-making include: the maturation of the 
prognostics health monitoring (PHM) field, novel sensor development, and the considerable gains made in 
computation power versus system size and data processing bandwidth. 
The science of prognostics involves modeling the underlying physics of a component or subsystem, modeling 
the physics of damage propagation mechanisms in the subsystem, determining criteria for an end-of-life threshold, 
and developing algorithms to propagate damage into the future that are robust to uncertainty. Sophisticated 
algorithms and physics based models coupled with these technological advances, enable prognostic health 
monitoring systems to reliably predict remaining useful life of components or subsystems. Decisions that balance 
mission objectives and constraints with remaining useful life predictions can be made autonomously to maintain 
safety requirements and achieve mission performance. This autonomous approach to decision-making will come 
with risks and benefits to the aerospace community.  
In this paper, we first provide a survey of previous work to quantify and assess autonomy in aerospace systems. 
A  applicable to piloted, remotely piloted, or unpiloted aircraft. Analysis and assessment of risks in autonomous 
decision-making with input from government, industry, and academic stakeholders will be presented. 
II. Autonomous Systems 
Humans design and build many types of complex, dynamical systems that operate in different time-scales in 
unpredictable, uncertain, and sometimes hostile environments. Often, some degree of autonomy is designed into 
systems and subsystems to address a number of issues, including, but not limited to: safety, cost, reliability, 
efficiency, robustness, accessibility, and physical size. The decision to include autonomy in a system is affected by 
many factors, such as availability, expense, and reliability of appropriate technology, the ability to verify and 
validate the autonomy for safety, and public trust of the autonomous system. Usually complex systems have some 
level of human interaction during operation, and therefore are not totally autonomous, with exceptions including 
robotic missions to distant locations in space where time and distance inhibit communication for operations. In this 
paper, autonomous systems include systems with some form of human interaction. 
Autonomy in aerospace systems has been mostly limited to uninhabited aerial vehicles or systems (UAV, UAS) 
and planetary flight vehicles. The American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics defines autonomy for UAVs 
as “a system’s own ability of sensing, perceiving, analyzing, communicating, planning, decision-making, and acting, 
to achieve its goal as assigned by human operators.”2 It is important to distinguish between the words autonomous 
and automatic. In Bruce Clough’s paper on the subject of autonomy for UAV’s, he compares the functions of an 
automatic system with an autonomous system, describing an automatic system, such as an autopilot, as one that 
executes plans exactly as they are programmed, whereas an autonomous system, such as an autonomous guidance 
system, can decide to execute actions without outside influence.
3
 While this paper here is focused on autonomy, and 
not automatic systems, we consider the decision to use automation a subset of autonomy. 
A. Levels of autonomy 
Much of the early work modeling the interaction between humans and computer systems is documented in the 
seminal book Telerobotics, Automation, and Human Supervisory Control by Thomas Sheridan
4
. Several important 
insights and models are developed in the book although the examples are mainly telerobotic systems (where the 
human is issuing commands to the system remotely) or human supervisory systems. In particular, Sheridan provides 
insight into the effects an operator’s trust, or lack of trust, has on an autonomous system. Trust in autonomy is the 
perceived technical and operational reliability and the confidence placed in the autonomy by a human. 
Sheridan’s work was later extended to create a framework to assist in the design of autonomous systems with 
human interaction
5
. Drawing from the wealth of literature on human factors studies, i.e., studies investigating human 
interaction with computerized systems, the authors identify what they consider to be the most relevant issues 
affecting autonomous systems with human interaction.  A model for types and levels of autonomy in systems with 
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human interaction is proposed along with criteria to determine the type and level of autonomy to design into a 
system with human interaction. 
The authors use a four-stage model of human information processing as a basis for formulating the types of 
autonomous functions a system can perform. The four types proposed for the framework include: information 
acquisition, information analysis, decision and action selection, and action implementation. The relationships 
between the types as these authors saw them are summarized in fig. 1. More recent studies of methods for 
determining the level of autonomy to design into a human spaceflight vehicle have adopted a similar decomposition 
of the types of autonomous functions for a spaceflight vehicle
6
. 
A measure of the level of autonomy of a system is desirable for system design and evaluation. A level of 
autonomy (LoA) value can be assigned for each type of autonomous function. The LoA is a number scale that 
represents low to high levels of automation. The lowest level represents no autonomy (i.e., total human control) and 
the highest level represents total autonomy with no human interaction. The ten levels of autonomy for decision and 
action selection, based on a taxonomy originally proposed by Sheridan are reproduced in Table 1 (using consistent 
grammar). Levels for the other types of autonomy are not presented in the study since the authors expected 
technology to evolve in these areas and there was a lack of empirical research on the interaction between those types 
of autonomy and human performance. 
The proposed model is intended to provide a framework for applying criteria to determine the type and level of 
autonomy to design into a system with human interaction. Design of an autonomous system is performed by 
decomposing the system into the framework described above and applying primary and secondary evaluation 
criteria. The consequence of autonomy on a human operator’s performance is the primary evaluation criteria applied 
in this framework. Based on documented studies of types of human performance affected by autonomy, the authors 
chose the following four categories for evaluating the consequences of autonomy on human performance: 
1) mental workload 
2) situation awareness 
3) complacency 
4) skill degradation 
Mental workload refers to the mental efforts a human must make to perform tasks or achieve goals within a 
temporal setting. Generally accepted components of mental workload include sensory input, cognitive processing, 
and psychomotor response. Situation awareness refers to the human’s awareness of the states of a system and its 
operating environment. A human interacting with an autonomous system can become complacent about the process 
Table 1. Levels of autonomy of decision and action selection. 
Level Value Computer or automation system action 
HIGH 10 Decides everything, acts autonomously, ignoring the 
human 
 9 Informs the human only if it (the computer) decides to 
 8 Informs the human only if asked 
 7 Executes automatically, then necessarily informs the 
human 
 6 Allows the human a restricted time to veto before 
automatic execution 
 5 Executes a suggested action if the human approves 
 4 Suggests one alternative 
 3 Narrows the selection down to a few 
 2 Offers a complete set of decision/action alternatives,  
LOW 1 Offers no assistance; no autonomy, human makes 
decisions and takes actions 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Categories of autonomous functions. 
Information 
acquisition
Information 
analysis
Decision and 
action selection
Action 
implementation
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or task that is being performed, trusting the computer to correctly achieve all of its goals or objective and possibly to 
even respond to off-nominal situations. The human may go so far as to cease attending to stimuli that would indicate 
a problem with the system being monitored. Skill degradation can occur when the human operator rarely performs a 
skill due to the fact that the autonomous system is always performing the tasks that require those skills.  
The secondary design criterion for the proposed framework balances reliability and costs of autonomy. Both the 
costs of decisions and the costs of action outcomes are included in this criterion. Design would then involve 
applying the two design criteria to determine the optimal level of autonomy to include in a system. Some limitations 
of the framework noted by the authors are the absence of suitable rules or guidance on selection of levels of 
autonomy and on assignment of weights for the criteria. 
The Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) loop
8
, developed by John Boyd and presented in his presentation 
“The Essence of Winning and Losing,” was designed to describe the battlefield decision-making process required to 
win against any opponent, see fig. 2. The OODA loop has been used for successful design and analysis of 
autonomous systems
6
. The basic premise of the OODA loop is to cycle through the loop, using information, 
decisions, or actions to inform the other elements of the loop. By understanding the opponent’s decision-making 
process and thereby anticipating his or her decisions, hopefully the actor can cycle through the loop before the 
opponent can make tactical changes. The task decomposition is similar to the decomposition shown in fig. 1; 
however, there is an idea of feedback between some of the components. 
Observations are made using information from the environment, decisions or hypotheses formed from a previous 
cycle, and observations of outcomes of actions performed in a previous cycle. During the orient task, information 
from the observe task is analyzed and synthesized in an attempt to understand the opponent and his or her next 
move. The observations are analyzed, filtered, and synthesized using a number of contexts, such as genetic heritage, 
cultural traditions, new information, and previous experiences. The decide task takes the synthesized information 
and makes decisions or forms new hypotheses which are then passed to the act task and back to the observe task. In 
this way, a hypothesis can inform the observe task about relevant observations to be made. The act task may perform 
an action or it may perform no action at all. The action or lack of action is fed back to the observe loop, which then 
can observe the unfolding interaction of the action with the environment. The OODA loop is really many loops 
working together. By observing the environmental changes resulting from action or inaction and by making 
observations that are informed by a hypothesis, the orient and decision-making tasks can improve their 
effectiveness.  
 
Fig. 2. John Boyd’s OODA Loop Diagram8 
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B. Decomposition of autonomous systems 
The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory proposed a hierarchical decomposition of autonomy requirements in the 
context of Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAV)
9
. This effort involved developing autonomy requirements for 
four mission scenarios, including: air-to-ground missions, close air support, air-to-air missions, and logistics re-
supply. Information from internal and external mission experts was distilled to understand the current practice using 
manned aircraft for these missions and how the missions might be accomplished using UCAVs. The hierarchical 
approach decomposes the missions into components that were shared among the missions and those that were 
unique to a mission. Five mission phases were identified as being shared by the four mission scenarios, including:  
 
I. Pre-mission plan 
II. Launch 
III. Enroute operations 
IV. Engagement or delivery 
V. Land and secure 
To further decompose the missions, ten elements were identified that apply throughout each mission. Among the ten 
elements, the following are common to non-military missions:  
1) Intelligent autonomy 
2) Sensing for situational awareness 
3) Communication 
4) Vehicle health management and monitoring 
5) Collaboration 
6) Data security 
7) Re-evaluation of mission feasibility 
The mission phases were further sub-divided and details were provided in three areas that were expected to 
illuminate potential difficulties for autonomous aircraft, including: 
a) Coordination between UCAVs and manned assets (fighter aircraft, carrier ATC and crew) 
b) Contingencies, or conditions or situations that might arise to affect the mission 
c) Situational awareness requirements 
Using the hierarchical decomposition of the missions described above, requirements for UCAV missions were 
derived. Since the intent of that work was to examine autonomy challenges driving design of future autonomous 
platforms, attention was focused on missions that were considered more challenging for UCAVs. 
A team of specialists for the National Academy of Sciences reviewed the Draper Lab research effort
42
 presented 
in ref.
 
9.  While ONR’s vision of complete intelligent autonomy as the goal of all future UAV/UCAV systems was 
ruled as unrealistic, the review team valued the insights into future research and development needs gained from the 
detailed mission analyses.  Software development, complexity, and cost were seen as critical elements affecting 
autonomous systems. The reviewers cited significant technology risks due to the lack of adequate tools providing a 
systematic approach for partitioning functions between machines and humans and for assessing benefits of 
autonomy. Human trust of an autonomous component or system was deemed to be the most difficult, yet important, 
attribute to attain when deploying autonomous systems. 
A later report describing robust autonomy and motivating scenarios
 
defines a robust autonomous system to be an 
autonomous system that is flexible and adaptable, capable of operating successfully in a dynamic, uncertain and 
possibly hostile environment, and in the face of imperfect information about both itself and its environment
10
. An 
approach combining functional and hierarchical decomposition with closed-loop planning and control is proposed to 
achieve robust autonomy. Problem decomposition is used to make the problem more tractable. First, the problem is 
decomposed into the following functions: perceiving, reasoning, and acting. Then the problem is decomposed into a 
hierarchy of smaller, partially coupled problems that can be solved independently, for fixed coupling constraints. 
Top levels of the hierarchy deal with the overall problem goals and constraints and have longer time horizons and 
lower levels of detail. Bottom levels of the hierarchy deal with detailed goals and constraints and have shorter time 
horizons and higher levels of detail. The researchers at Draper Labs had some success with their approach for 
specific applications; however, they acknowledged that control of a hierarchical planner is a difficult task, especially 
in dynamic and uncertain environments. They are continuing to develop a meta-controller to control the flow of data 
and commands within the hierarchy to help achieve overall consistent optimized system solutions in uncertain 
environments. 
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C. Autonomy metrics in robotic and aerospace systems 
When evaluating autonomous systems, it is desirable to have metrics for meaningful comparisons. Assessing the 
ability of an autonomous system to perform its task is a relevant goal of a metric. The so called intelligence of an 
autonomous system cannot be used to predict its ability to attain goals. Thus, intelligence metrics such as the Turing 
Test
11
 are not considered here. Several research teams have worked on categorizing and defining metrics for 
autonomous systems that describe the Levels of Autonomy (LOA) of systems
3,9,12-15
.  
Researchers at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico developed the “Mobility, Acquisition, and 
Protection” (MAP) survival metric space12. Six levels were used to describe a simple robot’s ability to perform the 
following tasks: 
1) Move in its environment 
2) Acquire energy 
3) Protect itself 
A radar chart is a simple way to graphically represent multivariate data in two dimensions. Researchers from the 
Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) at Wright-Patterson AFB used the three MAP metrics to form an axis of a 
radar chart. They showed the versatility of the MAP metric space by demonstrating that disparate objects such as an 
ant, a toaster, and a human can all be represented on one MAP radar chart. However, they found MAP to be 
inadequate when applied to assess autonomy of UAVs
3
. 
Besides evaluating the MAP metric space, AFRL explored work done by Draper Labs (see previous section) and 
decided to combine elements of each metric with some of their own ideas to develop the Autonomous Control Level 
(ACL) chart for UAVs
3
. See Table 2 for a copy of the ACL chart that was given in ref. 13. Eleven levels of 
autonomy were represented on the chart from the lowest level of autonomy to the highest level of autonomy. The 
lowest level, level 0, corresponds to a remotely piloted vehicle and the highest level, level 10, corresponds to a 
completely autonomous vehicle. The original metric space had three axes, but it was deemed inadequate to separate 
important issues, leading to the adoption of four axes based on Boyd's observe, orient, decide, and act loop. AFRL 
obtained satisfactory results when the ACL chart was applied to assess UAV efforts and to determine future UAV 
research directions. 
Table 2. AFRL Autonomous Control Level (ACL) chart.
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The Army’s System Simulation Development Directorate (SSDD) evaluated the AFRL ACL metrics and found 
them useful for measuring autonomy of relatively large UAVs operating in the Air Force mission space
13
. The 
SSDD analysis team modified the ACL chart to tailor its ability to analyze UAVs in their application area, e.g., 
tactical UAVs operating in an urban environment. Additional satisfaction criteria were included for the ACL levels 
along each of the four OODA dimensions. The satisfaction criteria were in the form of questions specific to a 
particular level of autonomy and task. 
An ad hoc working group of government and industry experts was developing a framework for autonomy levels 
of unmanned systems (ALFUS) in the early 2000’s14-15. Using a three axis system, the ALFUS Detailed Model was 
created to characterize autonomy levels for unmanned systems and their missions. The axes for the ALFUS Detailed 
Model are:  
1) Mission complexity 
2) Human interface 
3) Environmental difficulty 
To use the framework, the user decomposes a UAV mission into subtasks, and assigns a metric score to each of 
the three axes for that subtask. Moving from the lowest level subtasks to the highest, a metric score and weight is 
assigned to each axis for a given subtask. The metric scores and weights are averaged for each subtask level and 
combined with the next higher level’s subtask score. This process continues until the highest level subtask is 
included, resulting in a composite score for the mission and vehicle. The group reported that guidelines for 
decomposing tasks, prioritizing and weighting the metrics, correlating interdependencies among metrics, developing 
scoring scales for the metrics, and integrating the metrics to develop a concise set of indices for the autonomy levels 
need to be developed
15
. The ALFUS group was absorbed by the SAE-AS4D Committee on Performance Measures. 
In a study to develop a method for determining the level of autonomy to design into a human spaceflight vehicle 
management system, tasks were decomposed into a four-tiered architecture based on the OODA Loop
6
. The authors 
of this study wanted to devise a questionnaire and scale to assess costs, benefits, and the level of trust a human has 
in the autonomy. The level of human trust in an autonomous system is a subjective measure; hence the authors 
looked to the Cooper-Harper scale and questionnaire that is used to rate test-pilot assessments of aircraft handling 
qualities
16
. A questionnaire and scale was created, combining two metrics in this study, one to assess how much a 
human user trusts the autonomy in a system and a second to measure the cost/benefit ratio of the system. The 
objective was for the metric to distinguish systems with undesirable qualities. In particular, the metric was designed 
to identify systems in which there is 1) a high level of trust in the autonomy and a high cost/benefit ratio of the 
autonomy or 2) a low level of trust and a low cost/benefit ratio of the autonomy. 
D. Analysis of robotic and aerospace systems 
Work done to define metrics for robotic systems can be useful when defining metrics for autonomous aerospace 
systems. In ref. 17, metrics are proposed for several general tasks that robots would perform. Metrics are defined to 
evaluate the effectiveness, efficiency (in terms of time and effort), ability of a system to present information to a 
human, confidence or trust generated in a human, and various errors specific to the task. The authors also attempt to 
account for biasing effects, such as system latency differences, which could impact the metric across different 
solutions. The authors further suggest giving the system the ability to choose its level of autonomy to improve 
performance as measured by the metrics. Several papers report on various performance metrics for evaluation of 
autonomous systems
18-20
. 
A detailed study of the impact of autonomous system technology on uninhabited aerial vehicles was performed 
from a systems analysis point of view
21
. A number of different measures and metrics are proposed to estimate costs 
and benefits of autonomy, to estimate and track mission success, to assess autonomy intelligence and elegance. 
According to the authors, intelligence measures how well actions, tasks or roles are performed under varying 
degrees of task and environmental complexity and other associated constraints and conditions. Autonomy elegance  
is defined to be the computation efficiency by which the autonomous vehicle intelligence is implemented. Hence, 
two autonomous systems can be at nominally equivalent autonomy levels by exhibiting radically different levels of 
intelligence. First order functional relationships were proposed that relate autonomy metrics to vehicle 
characteristics and mission requirements. Analysis was performed using the proposed tools and metrics to gain 
insight into the amount of autonomy to include in a UAV mission. Development and implementation costs were 
kept to a minimum and vehicle performance was optimized in the context of vehicle autonomy and intelligence, 
while allowing for acceptable levels of success and risk. The general return on investment trends as a function of 
intelligence of the autonomy suggests the most benefit when incorporating a mid-level of intelligence for a mid-
level of autonomy. The contribution of individual autonomous system technologies were related conceptually and 
quantitatively to high-level programmatic goals, mission cost, risk, and return on investment criteria. The 
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quantitative analysis of the relative importance of individual autonomous system technologies identified 
technologies having statistically significant importance. 
An autonomy focused assessment methodology was developed and analyzed in ref. 22. In particular, the 
methodology is evaluated to consider its applicability and fitness in understanding and demonstrating the perceived 
strengths and weaknesses of autonomous solution options for representative military requirements. The intent of the 
assessment tool is to map solution options against requirements and to identify important operational analysis (OA) 
issues with capability development, procurement, cost of ownership, use, maintenance, and delivery risk. The 
assessment approach adopted in this study was to quantitatively link key measures such as cost and risk to levels of 
autonomy. A limitation identified by the study
22
 was the inability of the tool to capture the attributes of robustness of 
the system, that is, the ability of a system to continue working towards a specified goal notwithstanding a number of 
unpredicted events and degraded sub-system performance. It was deemed imperative that the assessment criteria be 
able to discriminate robust solution options. Consequently, a range of potential failure events were folded into the 
criteria. The assessment tool was developed to allow the use of different weighting sets and mappings of the criteria 
and to apply bounds to the criteria. The study proposes and demonstrates an integrated modeling and simulation 
approach that is then incorporated within an OA framework for analysis. 
The proposed integration of UAS into the civil airspace is prompting agencies throughout the world to examine 
the implications of autonomous systems. Researchers are developing architectures for system health management on 
civil UAS to ensure the safe operation of UAS in the civil airspace
23
. A framework for testing robust autonomy of 
UAS during design and certification has been proposed for implementation in Australia
20
. 
E. Human trust in autonomous systems 
It is important to be able to estimate the level of human trust in an autonomous system, since this affects 
adoption of the technology by operators. Trust in autonomy is generally needed if the human can choose whether to 
make use of the autonomy. However, it can be dangerous if humans trust an autonomous system that is unreliable. 
In ref. 4, the author describes the following seven attributes of autonomous systems that can positively or negatively 
affect human trust, see Table 3. 
The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) has conducted human factors research on supervision of simulated 
autonomous UAVs to explore issues associated with automation management
24
. In particular, AFRL has focused on 
operator performance, situation awareness, and trust in the autonomous system with different levels of autonomy 
and system reliability. Results of this study indicated that the operators would avoid using the autonomous 
functionality provided unless they had insufficient time to accomplish the task without assistance from the 
computer. When the study was recast to reduce the allowed time for operators to accomplish the desired task, the 
operators rated the work load as being higher and their trust ratings were lower. The study authors concluded that 
there is a complex relationship between LoA, time limits, and perception of task difficulty and confidence in 
autonomy. They also suggest exploring additional LoAs that are contingency/task specific and can be changed 
during a mission.  
A recent piloted simulation study of an emergency landing planner (ELP) provided interesting insights into 
human interaction with autonomy
25
. The researchers developed a sophisticated planner, designed to assist pilots in 
choosing the best emergency landing site when damage or failures occur in an aircraft. The planner was integrated 
into the cockpit of a 6 degree-of-freedom full-motion simulator for 757/767 category transport aircraft. Experiments 
were performed to evaluate the software using crews of professional airline pilots. The ELP proved to be helpful to 
the pilots in poor weather or wind conditions, where the ranking of best runway was more complex. The 
Table 3. Seven attributes of autonomous systems that can affect trust
4
. 
Attribute Example 
Reliability System consistently and repeatedly performs or functions correctly 
Robustness System can perform under a variety of conditions or circumstances 
Familiarity System employs procedures, terms, and cultural norms that are familiar or seem 
natural 
Understandability Human can form a mental model and predict future system behavior 
Explication of 
intention 
System explicitly communicates how it will behave (like having a contract) 
Usefulness System responds or behaves in a way that is useful to the human 
Dependence Dependence of the trusting person on the system 
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experiments provided interesting insights into the decisions pilots made in poor weather conditions. In one scenario, 
some of the pilot teams chose a longer runway with poor weather conditions that was lower ranked by the ELP over 
a shorter runway with better conditions. Generally, the pilots who chose the shorter runway that was ranked highest 
by the ELP were able to safely land the plane. However, in almost every case where the pilots chose the lower 
ranked but longer runway, the outcome was a fatal accident in simulation.    
III. Autonomous Decision-making using PHM Information 
We define autonomous decision-making using PHM information to be the process that is carried out in reaction 
to changed health management information or to changed mission goals. The result of the decision-making is a set 
of appropriate mitigating actions that are meant to resolve the issue stemming from the degraded state of health or 
changed goals. The selection process involves, or is, a general decision-making process that is either 1) reactive, to 
ensure immediate proper functionality or safety; or 2) goal seeking, to re-plan activities or modify system or 
subsystem operation to mitigate future events that would require reactive decision-making. The determination of 
which of the activities are carried out depends to a large degree on the prognostic horizon, or, more specifically, the 
time to expected failure.  If, for example, the time-to-failure is very short (say, in the range of milliseconds), one 
needs to generally react fast using adaptive control mechanisms at the machine controller level.  If the prognostic 
horizon is in the second range, appropriate contingencies may involve control reallocation or reconfiguration, i.e., 
the use of other components or subsystems.  If the prognostic horizon is even longer, one can consider mission re-
planning.  Finally, if the prognostic horizon is considerably longer, perhaps even extending beyond the duration of 
the mission at hand, one could integrate the logistics operations and consider various optimal maintenance actions.  
It should be noted that these contingency management actions are realized with very different decision-making 
techniques. If the contingency management is realized via adaptive controls, then the controller needs to be modified 
to react to changed objectives. This can be accomplished by either modification of the controller gains, modification 
of the control modifiers, modification of the control schedules, or modification of the control structure. To account 
for the short time scale, these solutions may have been pre-compiled and it is just a matter of a look-up to execute 
the right solution. 
Work in integrating fault information has been performed for a long time in fault tolerant control
26-27
, but also in 
life-extending controls
28-29
. Generally, life-extending control attempts to modify control logic or control hardware to 
influence life consuming factors. This approach has been applied to aircraft engines where reduction of creep 
damage to turbine blades was accomplished by incorporating an engine damage model into the flight mission. 
Through optimization over flight time, fuel consumption, and component damages overall operation cost was 
reduced
29
. In other work, a model-based detection scheme was coupled with controller adjustments that were pre-
compiled off-line using evolutionary algorithms to identify optimal biases and adaptive control
30
.  
A PHM-based reconfigurable controls framework that is part of hierarchical control architecture is defined in ref. 
31. The low-level reconfigurable controller is defined as a time-varying multi-objective criterion function with 
appropriate constraints to determine optimal set-point reconfiguration. A set of necessary conditions are established 
to ensure the stability and boundedness of the composite system. The integration of prognostics in the control loop 
using receding horizon control principles is presented in ref. 32. Life-extending control of multi-degree of freedom 
mass-beam structure where the control policy is formulated based on the analysis of stochastic time series data of 
sensors is described in ref. 33. 
For situations with somewhat larger prognostic horizon, re-planning and rescheduling may be the appropriate 
action (perhaps in conjunction with controller changes). An agent-based architecture that integrates fault detection 
and re-planning activities is described and demonstrated with fault injection aboard a spacecraft
34
. A similar fault 
tolerant planning environment is described in ref. 35. 
Finally, if the prognostic horizon is sufficiently large, one can consider various long-term actions that might 
include maintenance and inclusion of logistics elements. Challenges arise from the large amount of different 
information pieces upon which a decision-maker has to act.  Consider, as an example, a decision support system for 
use in operational decision-making in the context of running missions and performing maintenance.  The decision 
support system enables the user to make optimal decisions based on his/her expression of rigorous trade-offs 
through guided evaluation of different optimal decision alternatives under operational boundary conditions using 
user-specific and interactive collaboration.  An Evolutionary Multi-Objective Optimization can perform the search 
in this space and generate a set of optimal solutions (the “Pareto frontier”).  This will result in the identification of 
alternative mission allocations and maintenance plans that are optimal along IVHM-specific objectives (e.g., overall 
mission success, safety, and maintenance cost)
36
. Because this set of optimal solutions may still be too large to just 
choose any arbitrary one, it is required to further down-select the solutions using appropriate techniques that allow 
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an assessment of the trade-offs across numerous dimensions. Depending on present and future requirements, the 
end-user would use context-dependent criteria to constrain the number of solutions using interactive tools to finally 
select the operational plan that best meets the field requirements.  Such an interactive method would also allow users 
to employ what-if situations, permitting them to manually test the robustness of the solution. Finally, the mitigation 
of faults in an autonomous setting through stochastic optimization integrating fault risk assessment and risk 
management techniques is described in ref. 37. 
IV. Perceived Risks in Acceptance of Autonomous Decision-making 
Interviews were conducted with a few dozen individuals from industry, government, and academia. The 
objective of the interviews was to determine perceived risks in acceptance of autonomous decision-making in the 
context of piloted aircraft. The results are summarized below. 
A. Human performance consequences in mixed initiative scenarios 
There are many aspects of autonomous decision-making using PHM that could impact the performance of 
humans interfacing with the aircraft, including pilots, mechanics, air traffic controllers, and ground operations 
crews. In mixed-initiative scenarios, i.e., where autonomous systems have to interact with humans in some ways, 
human performance may be impacted in positive ways but also in negative ways. Finding the appropriate balance of 
autonomy is one key aspect to increasing the positive performance consequences. For mixed-initiative scenarios, a 
medium level of autonomy appears to be generally the best approach
4,6,10,22,23
. A higher level of autonomy is 
perceived as having possible negative consequences on human performance. Below is a summary of the types of 
human performance that can be affected by mixed-initiative systems. 
 
1. User workload 
Autonomous decision-making can reduce the pilot workload by performing tasks without pilot interaction. If the 
actions are completely reliable, the benefits are clear. However, since there are few cases of 100% reliability in 
complex systems, there is a change of increased workload because the pilot or ground crew would have additional 
work to clear the erroneous action from the system. Where an autonomous system requires increased level of 
interaction with a pilot input the benefits may be negated if the user could have come up with the same resolution in 
the same amount of time. Further, autonomous decision-making could increase user workload do to the complexities 
of communicating the changes to the operator. If frequent active scans are required to keep abreast of the latest 
changes, the benefits are again diminished. 
 
2. Situation awareness 
If changes in the state or dynamics of a system are masked by autonomous decision-making, the human could 
encounter a situation where critical decisions are made with incomplete or inaccurate information
15
. This problem 
would be compounded by time constraints on the human operator. Humans might miss important trends in low 
criticality areas where the system is autonomously changing due to PHM information without appropriate human 
notification. In 1991, there was an SAS incident in which a McDonnell Douglas MD-81 aircraft was not properly 
de-iced
38
. The engines ingested clear ice from the wings, which broke free during take-off, causing engine surges. 
The surges destroyed the engines, requiring the pilots to crash land. Fortunately, there were no fatalities. About 25 
seconds after take-off, the pilots perceived banging, vibrations, and jerks in the aircraft. They responded to an engine 
2 surge by throttling back the engine. However, due to the operating point in the flight envelope, the throttle was 
simultaneously controlled by an automatic thrust restoration (ATR) system, which increases throttle setting with 
altitude. The ATR system caused additional engine surges that eventually destroyed the engines. The airline was 
unaware of the existence of the ATR system; consequently they had not trained the pilots on proper response to the 
situation. This case illustrates automation causing a lack of situation awareness for the crew, since the crew was 
unaware of the ATR system and its affect on throttle position. It is also noteworthy that the ATR system designers 
did not appear to include the OODA Loop philosophy of having the automation observe the results of its actions, 
i.e., that the engines were surging.  
 
3. Complacency of humans 
If the autonomous decision-making is highly reliable, but not completely reliable or robust to unmodeled 
dynamics, then the human operator could relax their vigilance for off-nominal behavior, missing the occasional time 
that there is an undetected problem. When the human work load is the highest, it is natural for the human to become 
even more reliant on autonomously controlled tasks. Even though the human might know that a system has a certain 
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probability of making an error when suggesting options, the human can get distracted by the information presented 
and the choices to be made, forgetting that either of these two things could be incorrect. 
 
4. Skill degradation 
With a lack of use of certain skills, humans are liable to forget certain elements. Literature from cognitive 
psychology states that humans forget information and their skills decay over time with disuse
4
. Studies have shown 
that when an autonomous system fails, an intermediate level of autonomy tends to result in better performance by 
the human operators, presumably because they have had more skill practice
4
. 
 
5. Human trust in the system 
Lack of trust in autonomous systems may be some of the biggest hurdles in adopting autonomy in mixed-
initiative settings. Numerous experimental results suggest that humans have a difficult time giving up control of a 
complex task that they can perform proficiently, especially when they have to give control to a complex computer 
system
24-25
. This has in part to do with awareness of the failings of previous autonomous systems but it may also be 
due to other psychological elements where the human simply wants to “stay in control”. Where operators do 
relinquish their decision-making authority, it is often only due to time constraints
22-23
. The emotional response to 
autonomous systems may even be manifested in fear
39
. It is expected that autonomy in mixed-initiative systems will 
slowly gain acceptance, in part through adoption of automated tasks such as auto-pilot and the automatic control of 
subsystems (such as jet engines).  
B. Autonomy reliability 
Many of the interviewed individuals cited reliability of autonomous systems, including the reliability of sensors, 
communication, and algorithms, as being one of the greatest risks. The reliability of the autonomous system must be 
end-to-end, i.e., it is not sufficient to reliably detect a fault if the response (maybe just simple logging for 
maintenance) has lower reliability. The guiding mantra is that an autonomous system must do no harm. Proving that 
an autonomous system is on average more reliable will be difficult because the avoidance of a situation that would 
have had negative safety implications is hard to validate. The required degree of reliability will be determined 
criticality of a task. 
C. Autonomy effectiveness and robustness 
Adding autonomy to a system greatly increases the amount of verification and validation required and with that 
the cost for deployment. Adding complexity to a system increases also the probability of errors, possibly negating 
any beneficial effects. If, after all the additional investment of resources, the resulting system is not more effective 
or at improving safety than a non-automated system (or less robust), then its use is not justifiable. Obtaining 
certification from the FAA could be another major stumbling block. The difficulties that commercial operators have 
in obtaining maintenance credits for aircraft with on-board health and usage monitoring systems will likely be 
magnified for certification attempts of autonomous subsystems. From a commercial perspective, providing the 
appropriate business case for autonomous systems will be needed to justify adding autonomous functions. 
Deployment of autonomy on civil transport aircraft is dependent on development of new methodologies to 
certify airborne software and to satisfy FAA airworthiness requirements. Adaptive controllers that use real-time 
system input/output information and some form of on-line learning algorithm to adaptively set controller gains can 
be seen as providing a low level of autonomy. Current research and development of adaptive flight control for 
aircraft operating in off-nominal situations shows promise, however many issues exist for their verification and 
validation by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration
40
.  
D. Costs of Decisions 
The costs of the decisions made by an autonomous system must be heavily balanced to increase safety of 
humans affected by the system and secondarily to decrease damage to a system. Autonomous systems that have to 
choose solutions in a multi-objective environment are faced with the difficulty of making context-dependent 
choices. These are hard to encode since the plurality of all possible contexts is difficult to encapsulate. Furthermore, 
the weights of individual objectives may change dynamically due to unforeseen circumstances which further 
complicate the decision choice. 
E. Public perception 
In the end, commercial operators need to be sensitive to the way their system is perceived by the public. A bias 
exists that a human would handle certain situations in a more sensible way than a completely autonomous system
41
. 
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In a hypothetical scenario where a piloted aircraft and an unpiloted aircraft both crash into a school, it would be 
more likely that public would perceive the pilot as having tried to avoid hitting the school, whereas the autonomous 
system would be perceived as “cold-hearted.” Public belief tends to be that designers are incapable of adding a 
“humane” aspect to the decision-making used in autonomous systems. The public’s perception of autonomy can 
have serious consequences for airline carriers. Similar issues have been considered for advanced terrestrial 
applications, such as platooning (autonomous following of several cars on highways)
42
. Currently, there is a slow 
migration towards the public acceptance of autonomy, for example in parallel parking assist
43 
and autonomous 
distance keeping for luxury cars. However, it is still a long way from adoption in aerospace settings. 
V. Conclusions 
Prior research into metrics and design for autonomy were presented. At this time, the prospect of adding 
significant autonomous decision-making on a piloted aircraft is viewed with some degree of concern for the ability 
of the system to add value without adding risk.  
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